

Rural History Conference, 2010
Brighton, UK
Session: Fascism and rural modernization revisited
Wednesday, 15th of September, 14-17, room 202

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a reconsideration

Miguel Cabo

(Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

Lourenzo Fernández Prieto

(Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

Juan Pan-Montojo

(Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

1. Premises of our approach

This session and, by extension, our presentation – intended to serve as a framework – have an eminently comparative aim: to analyze the agrarian policies and, more specifically, the rural policies of fascist regimes in the interwar period. Fascism has been the subject of an overwhelming amount of historiographical studies, to which new titles are constantly being added, and the focus of discussions that should be taken as references. Given the comparative approach adopted in this session of the Rural History Conference, it is implied that our work is based on a view of ‘fascism’ as applicable to different movements and regimes of the interwar period (Payne, Griffin, Paxton) which have a number of elements in common (the so-called ‘fascist minimum’). We are not following, then, the ‘exceptionalist’ thesis according to which each such movement or regime has unique characteristics that would render any comparative attempt useless and entail the rejection of fascism as a generic notion (Bracher, De Felice).¹

In the interwar period and during WW2, there were in most Western countries (and even in the Far East: Japan) political movements that shared many symbolic, doctrinal, organizational and strategic traits with Italian fascism. When these political movements seized power, either through electoral mechanisms or successful coups d’état, or thanks to the Italian or German military imposition, we talk of fascist regimes. But there were national states where fascists ruled in informal coalition with other right-wing groups and pre-existing authoritarian regimes that adopted fascist elements before WW2 or during the war. In those cases (Austria before 1938, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Hungary before 1944, Romania or Vichy France, among others) there are authors who talk of quasi-fascist, para-fascist and fascistized regimes, and authors that deny the inclusion of these mixed regimes in the fascist family.

A potential way of breaking the impasse of historiographic debates on fascism lies in sector analysis (youth, gender, etc.). This is what we will attempt to do here from a rural perspective². And it will be all the more relevant since the authors that deny the modernizing nature of fascisms usually refer to the ruralist load of the fascist discourse,

¹ The literature on fascism is extremely vast. A useful overview of the current state of the issue can be found in Bosworth (2009).

² Corni (1987) is the only comparative study of the agrarian policies of Italy and Germany available at the moment.

thus automatically – and very disputably – identifying ‘modernization’ with ‘urban world’ and ‘underdevelopment’ with ‘rural world.’ Agrarian policies affected very different parts of the population and the economy and were designed in political contexts defined by an initial support for fascism in rural society but also by the involvement of the agrarian elites in the new political class, which had distinct traits in each country. The debate around the existence or inexistence of the political category of fascism has a lot to do with the political coalitions that led to the success of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes in interwar Europe (and Asia when we consider the Japanese case) and around the social bases of those coalitions; a debate that necessarily intersects with the one concerning the acceptance of the very notion of a fascist agrarian regime.

To address the question of fascist agrarian policies, and in spite of certain unavoidable references that will need to be made, we will deal with fascist regimes and not with fascist movements (before they seized power). Also, in the case of fascistized regimes, like the Iberian ones, we will just analyze the period in which fascist elements came to have a larger impact than conservative or authoritarian ones – a period that coincides with the years before 1945. We will also present however an overview of the continuity of these policies in the ensuing years.

2. The six components of the ‘common minimum’ in the rural policies of fascisms

The first common feature of the various fascisms is easy to detect: a strong ruralist component on the discursive-ideological plane. It implies a praise of peasantry and rural life, whose contribution to the nation was assumed to go far beyond strictly economic limits. The countryside was assumed to carry cultural, demographic and social values that made it a vehicle to maintain the vitality of the whole society and – although it was only fascism that made this fully explicit in racial terms – the ‘purity’ and essence of the nation (Bergmann 1970, Conte 1987, Veiga 1987, Rosas 1989). The background to this discourse is obviously much older: it came with a contemporary reaction to the development of industrialization and urbanization processes throughout the European continent (and outside it too, as occurred with Jeffersonianism in the USA). Being a highly significant feature, the relevance of this component in the definition of the fascist discourse is nevertheless limited by three considerations. The first one is the fact that ruralism was present in many ideosystems: from those nostalgic for the Ancien Régime in the 19th century to social Catholicism through anarchism, most nationalisms and the most conservative versions of liberalism. The second consideration is that, in the case of the two main manifestations of fascism, a ‘rural turn’ was perceived (in 1920 in Italy and in 1928 in Germany) only after the failure of the expansion strategies targeted at working-class and urban environments, which makes one wonder how much pragmatism and tacticism was involved, and how much involved principles (Renton 2001, Lyttelton 2003). Finally, fascism praised rural values – identified with national values – and promised to foster agrarian production, but its discourse was neither anti-industrial (if at all, it was anti-urban) nor technophobic: moreover, fascist movements leaned to technolatracy and shared with the “isms” of the early 20th century a generalized admiration for scientific achievements.

Secondly, all fascist regimes gave the agrarian sector a primary role – to guarantee the country’s food self-sufficiency and, consequently, to ensure the country’s independence

of other powers or the feasibility of aggressive foreign policies. In the case of Germany, this aspiration was strengthened by the memory of the erosion of the domestic front during the Great War as a result of the Entente's blockade. It cannot be a coincidence that strongly propagandist campaigns were launched to reduce dependence on imports in basic sectors, such as the paradigmatic "Battle for Grain" in Italy, the German "Erzeugungsschlacht", the Portuguese "Campanha do Trigo" or the self-sufficiency opted for by Francoism until the early 1950s. Other actions included in agrarian policies, such as protectionism, import quotas or bans on imported livestock fodder, were, however, some of the means by which many countries addressed the Depression of the 1930s.

The third characteristic shared by the regimes analyzed here is the prevalence of State intervention with a view to protecting certain so-called higher values that could not be left at the mercy of offer and demand. In this connection, a highly illustrative event took place during the first months of Hitler's Chancellery. At that time the Ministry of Agriculture was headed by Alfred Hugenberg (DNVP), who put forward an aid scheme for farms in difficulty which left out, however, farms that were smaller and considered economically unviable. The main ideologist of the *Blut und Boden*, Walther Darré, headed a campaign against this scheme in June 1933, when Hugenberg left the Government, on the basis that every German farmer should be helped regardless of the profitability of their farms.

In the fourth place, reforms that did not question the framework of land ownership (internal settlements, water infrastructures) were preferred. This aspect was reinforced through the co-opting of many professionals linked to the primary sector who saw dictatorships as an opportunity to implement their proposals, overcoming what many considered to be obstacles inherent to parliamentary systems (Paxton 1997, Aquarone 1964, Oliveira 1990, Brüggemeier 2005, Herf 1984) – an image of the efficiency and energy that fascist regimes claimed for themselves, obviously with no qualms at all. Hence the critical technocratic and modernizing boost to farming, on which we will insist when dealing with the technical aspects of the agrarian turn.

One further common characteristic is the application of corporate designs that should, theoretically, channel the clashes of the various socioeconomic interests, harmonizing these under the fatherly eye of the State. Corporativism preceded fascisms, and its principal champions in the years before the Great War were to be found in the Catholic world, which presented corporativism as an alternative to liberal individualism and the socialist class struggle. Fascisms added, however, two important qualifications: putting corporativism at the service of the State, and understanding it as the crystallization of the 'national community' (the *Volksgemeinschaft* of Nazism) over the differences among the various sectors (landowners and non-landowners, large and small properties, producers and process industries, etc.). In the real world, however, historiography has found that the practical reach of corporativism was modest, and that the so-called reconciliation of interests within the agrarian sector was always biased in favour of large properties in case of conflict (Corner 1974, Cardoza 1983, Giorgetti 1974, Rosas, Cleary, Kluge).

To finish the panoply of similarities, it should be concluded from the not few studies available on the agrarian policies of fascisms that, in practice, the agrarian sector was eventually subordinated to the needs of other economic sectors, particularly the arms

industry. An option that was consistent with their modernizing impulse but also with bellicose fascist imperialism. The exception would be the Salazarist dictatorship, consistent, in this case, with the ruralist discourse. All of the above can be proven with several examples of clashes between the exaltation of ruralism and industrial needs. The first of such examples could be the distribution of active workforce. In spite of the implementation of a number of restrictive measures, neither in Germany nor in Italy was the rural exodus stopped – an exodus so often denounced and resulting from a much older dynamic that dictatorships eventually did not oppose, as this would have damaged their industrialization and rearmament efforts. The same thing could be said of the spread of mechanization, which, according to its most impassionate critics, ‘dehumanized’ and ‘industrialized’ agriculture, but which was necessary to maintain production and stimulate domestic demand for industrial goods. In countries that had not yet completed their industrialization process (all of them but Germany), agrarian exports served to finance the reinforcement of the industry (Italy’s Quota 90 symbolizing the prevalence of the interests of the industry).

In summary, fascisms could be said to have the following distinctive traits: aim at self-sufficiency, State intervention, faith in the virtuality of science and technology as applied to the agrarian sector, corporativism as the keystone of rural society, and subordination, in practice, to the interests of other economic sectors in case of conflict in spite of a pervasive ruralist discourse. Every one of these elements characterizes other regimes and historical periods, both previous and subsequent to fascisms. What sets fascisms apart is the simultaneous combination of all such elements and their presence in the global ideological framework inherent to fascisms.

3. Differential elements of fascist agrarian regimes

While we have summed up and underlined the common ground of principles and instruments in fascist agrarian policies – some of them arising from the utilization of common doctrinal approaches and models, some of them as a mere adaptation to similar political or economic challenges – we cannot ignore either the wide differences that separated them.

To start with, we have to remember the diverse chronologies we are talking about. Whereas Italian fascism ruled in the 1920s, in the 1930s and, partially, in the exceptional circumstances of the war period, in Germany the experience was reduced to the 1930s and the 2WW, and in France just to the latter. In Spain the sequence was, as you know, the opposite, and then the regime, like the Portuguese, lasted three decades after 1945. Since the circumstances of international agriculture changed so much before and after 1929 and before and after 1939 (let alone the break brought about by the collapse of the Axis in 1945), a comparison of non-synchronic policies poses many problems. But even if we try to overcome them by looking at a limited time period, we encounter a highly heterogeneous landscape. Fascist and philo-fascist ministries of agriculture were faced in the 1930s with relatively homogeneous problems (fall of domestic and external demand, decrease in agrarian prices, shrinking revenues of agrarian households, unemployment in urban areas that slowed down the emigration from the countryside, geostrategic and military plans that brought with them a preference for industrial growth but a parallel need to keep the levels of agrarian output,

etc.) and dealt with them, as we have seen, with discourses and public policies that shared common traits but under structural and political conditions that differed greatly.

First of all, agriculture as such had a very different weight from country to country both in terms of the GDP and in terms of the employed population. From the latter point of view, Germany (30.5% in 1930) and France (34% in 1931) could be defined, as industrial societies, by the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1929. Spain (48.2% in 1930), Japan (49.5%), Hungary (53.1% in 1930), Italy (53.8% in 1931) and Portugal (more than 60%) were still agrarian countries even though with very different industrial sectors. The role of agriculture in global economic development, a modern objective of governance that was proclaimed by all fascist and authoritarian regimes, was consequently very different among these countries. The agricultural policy was a secondary policy, at least before the war, for the German economy, but it was the key of the global economic policy for Portugal, Spain, Italy or Hungary.

In the second place, rural structures were very diverse as well: whereas in France and Japan small and middle-sized farms, owned by their cultivators, dominated in most of the regions, the situation in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Germany was much more heterogeneous. In all these four countries, large estates worked by seasonal wage labourers prevailed at least in a considerable part of the countryside (the north-east in Germany, the south in Spain and Portugal, the north and the south in Italy) and were present in other regions to a certain extent. But there also existed a large and diverse peasantry that worked both its own fields and leased land, even in the areas where large estates outran the other types of farms. Rural structural policies and the social target of technological options (large and middle-sized farmers or peasantry) needed therefore to be different even if the aim of a viable middle-sized farm tended to be widely shared and defended in most, not in all, fascist and fascistized countries.

Thirdly, labourers, small peasants, middle-sized farmers and big landowners coexisted in all these rural societies, but their presence, class identities and power varied greatly from area to area and even from village to village. Rural structures did not strictly correspond to a typology of rural organizations before the seizure of power by the fascists. Socialist or anarchist unions tended to attract agrarian labourers, whereas independent, Catholic, democratic or republican local unions, more often than not federated in regional or national associations, were linked to small and middle-sized peasant communities. But the dimensions of class unions and the connection between them and peasant unions, and especially between the latter and organizations controlled by big landowners, were very different among the countries that we are considering. On the other hand, the map of agrarian organizations in each country did not entail a specific political stance of rural society on fascist movements. The counter-revolutionary alliance embodied in fascist organizations was supported everywhere by certain sectors of rural society, but there was not a clear-cut pattern relating pre-fascist organizations or social structures and support for the fascist movement (as the Michael Mann's comparative approach has showed), unless we cross these variables with others, such as religion, political allegiance, etc. Differences in rural support for fascism could match or not differences in price and commercial policies. Even though rewarding materially its social bases could be an initial objective of the agricultural economic policies of fascism, there were other mechanisms to seek support and consensus in rural society that could compensate for the shortcomings of agrarian policies from an

economic point of view (see, for instance, the “modernization” of the media in villages in Nazi time, in Trossbach and Zimmermann 2006).

The last remark leads us to a fourth level of differences. Fascism rejected democracy and all the democratic mechanisms of political participation, but needed and favoured active involvement of the population in politics. The degree of political mobilization of rural society can be regarded as an index of fulfillment of what we can term the fascist model. Mobilization was necessarily low in occupied countries like France and not carried very far away in Spain in the aftermath of the Civil War. Mobilization could bring with it the urbanization of local politics and the transformation of social relations, and thus a certain type of modernization, understood as either a break or an acceleration of previous tendencies of change that did not imply any return to traditional local dynamics, whenever the corresponding tradition can be identified.

Finally, agrarian policies were not thought out in the same way when there were plans that included military campaigns and eventually territorial expansion (Italy, Germany and Japan) and when those plans did not exist or had a marginal short-term importance in the political project of local fascism (Vichy, Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal). On the one hand, territorial aims made it imperative to organize the production of food and raw materials with a geostrategic view; on the other hand, neocolonial ambitions (the Ostrau, Manchuria or the African empires, among others) offered a potential, and in certain cases an immediate, outlet for rural conflicts that was absent where the projects had more to do with irredentism or expansion “on paper”.

4. The interplay of continuity and break

Looking at and comparing different regimes in different periods with non-synchronous policies may be a source of confusion, but at the same time it benefits and clarifies this discussion of fascism, its modernizing nature, its various historical expressions in Europe and Asia, and the time and timing of its development. The time of the modernizing fascism is different – shorter – than the time of the modernization ideology, and previous to the period of agricultural modernization that is identified with the Green Revolution.

The time of fascisms spans the twenty years of the interwar period (1919-1939) to the end of the war in 1945 – a reaction to the Russian Revolution and, at the same time, a national solution to the decadence and the defeat in the Great War of the old world of the 19th century. Our interest here is to analyze solely the implementation and validity of fascism-inspired agrarian policies in fascist or fascistized regimes that emerged at the time of fascism, a time that ended with the military defeat of fascism in 1945. After this date, some of the authoritarian modernization policies developed at the time of fascism would still be applied in the totalitarian context of historically fascist regimes, such as the Portuguese and the Spanish ones. These policies would then be followed precisely by the period of agrarian modernization par excellence – headed by the State and promoted by input companies – known as the Green Revolution, whose model began brewing in America in the early 1940s.

The ideal and the promotion of agrarian modernization have a long history associated with industrialization and as an ideological complement to it, having been defined as

early as in the late 18th century and, more carefully and comprehensively, throughout the 19th century. Agrarian modernization was present in the idea of “improvement”, of agricultural progress, in the model of the *imprenditori* and “gentlemen farmers”. The ideology of attaining agricultural industrialization some day and turning agriculture into a form of manufacture was deeply rooted in and was consistent with the promotion of industrialization and the changes that came with it before the 20th century and the First World War.

Socialist and conservative models of agricultural modernization were clearly defined from as early as the late 19th century (K. Kautsky, *On the Agrarian Question*, 1899), and shared an idea of industrialization as a way of agricultural modernization and progress for the rural world. The modernization age began with the universal triumph of the modernization paradigm, identified with the systematic application of science to agriculture and with technological development intended to bring the various forms of agricultural production as close as possible to those of industrial production. This modernization age came after the Second World War and is identified with the triumph and implementation of the Green Revolution (W. Picado & Fernández Prieto 2007). That was the short, paradigmatic time of agricultural modernization, to which there was no alternative in the two blocks of the Cold War.

Fascism had its place in that long lifetime of the ideology of agrarian modernization that began with the Enlightenment and constituted an authoritarian modernization proposal model, with very different versions depending on how fascisms seized power or consolidated their position in it. Regardless of its peasant-oriented rhetoric, fascism consistently presented itself as a path to modernization, almost always with scientific bases and technical and scientific support. In fact, with their modernizing, technocratic force, science and a number of scientists helped define, to a large extent, the economic policies of European fascisms in Germany, Italy, Portugal or Spain, as well as fascism itself. This was one of the primary conclusions of the meeting *Autarky. A workshop in Genetics and Political Economy of Fascism* (UCLA Center for Society and Genetics, May 2008). The technocratic elements of regimes such as the Portuguese or the Spanish ones for the entire duration of these regimes came precisely from this modernization logic promoted by science, and coincided with it (Pan-Montojo 2005 and 2008, Fernández Prieto 2007).

Looking back, many of the distinguishing marks of the fascists’ agrarian policies have clear precedents in, for example, social Catholicism (corporativism, ruralism), the trend seen from the turn-of-the-century agrarian crisis towards stronger State intervention (which was later enshrined during the Great War) and the ruralist drift of the conservatism that opposed the social changes associated with industrialization. The most technocratic proposals of agricultural engineers, agronomists, veterinaries, forest engineers and other technicians were very often not very far away from the global view of an authoritarian and upside-down transformation of the countryside into an efficient machine of agrarian production. Much more than ever before, the State would be the great instrument for rural modernization from 1918, both in its communist and its fascist or liberal versions. State intervention would grow stronger after 1945, in the framework of the Green Revolution, and up to our days. It would be necessary as well to explore the coincidental elements of such intervention with politically opposite regimes: the New Deal in the USA, the policies of the Popular Front in France – and find out whether they were merely simultaneous or, rather, influenced each other.

Looking forward, what is the legacy that the agrarian/rural policies of the different regimes left to their democratic successors? Centralized technical direction, economic regulation and political planning of rural society, coupled with a discourse of defence of the traditional values of the national countryside – are they just an inheritance from the political response to war necessities or a quasi-universal path of agricultural development in the capitalist system, or do they also bear a direct connection with the need of reconciling the state with farmers, using certain fascist elements as Milward defends? Moreover – and nearly bordering provocation – cannot we detect certain components of EU policies that are present in far-right dictatorships?³ The response of rural society is important as well: cooperation or resistance, consensus or reluctance. The effects on local communities are yet other aspects to explore. Fascism may be considered an authoritarian model of agrarian modernization, but one that had very different versions depending on how fascism seized power or consolidated its position in it. German fascism used and revived some instruments of civil society (Harwood 2008, Gerhard 2008), whereas Portuguese and, to an even greater extent, Spanish fascism built their modernizing policies with very scant support, in an authoritarian context of destruction of a civil society that was replaced with another corporative – yet hardly functional in practice – society. This affected the policies of these fascisms and their implementation: with more support in Germany and Italy, and less in Spain and Portugal.

Francoism is, precisely, an example of the modernizing nature of fascism. Which is quite a paradox as well, given the period when some of the modernizing Francoist policies were developed, and given its orientation: Catholic and conservative, filled with fascist overtones. Some of the most successful Francoist policies were fascist in nature and, above all, autocratic in their implementation, aiming at autarchy. This was the case of the reforestation of the Iberian Peninsula from the 1940s. It entailed the State's compulsory expropriation of thousands of hectares of communal land, and a change in the use of such land in order to increase its yield and promote self-sufficiency in wood and wood pulp, following experts' proposal. Here is the most technocratic, authoritarian proposal among those put forward by forest engineers, whose success required the authoritarian power of the State and the previous dismantling of rural society (Rico, 1998). The same thing can be said of the water and reservoir policy, partly designed during the Second Republic and executed autocratically throughout Francoism, displacing thousands of families from their settlements. Paradoxically, these policies were followed, from the late 1950s, by others developed along the lines of the modernizing logic of the Green Revolution. This was, for instance, the case of the land consolidation policy, executed as well in accordance with the keystones of the fascist authoritarianism of the regime, filled with modernizing technocratism. Yet this policy was not conceived according to the self-sufficiency logic of the interwar period any longer, but precisely according to the idea of modernization oozed from the Green Revolution and inspired by the relationships with the United States from the mid-1950s.

³ We would not be the first to suggest this. For example, Adam Tooze (2008: 176) has recently suggested that it was the Third Reich and, more specifically, the Reichsnährstand that “initiated the hybrid system of private ownership and state management that continues to prevail in European agriculture to this day”.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

- AQUARONE, A. (1964): "Aspirazioni tecnocratiche del primo fascismo", *Nord e Sud*, 52, pp.109-128.
- BERGMANN, K. (1970): *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft*. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain.
- BOSWORTH, R.J.B. (ed., 2009): *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*. Oxford U.P.
- BRÜGGEMEIER, F.-J. et al. (2005): *How Green were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich*. Ohio U.P.
- CARDOZA, A.L. (1983): *Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism. The Province of Bologna, 1901-1926*. Princeton U.P.
- CLEARY, M.C. (1989): *Peasants, politicians and producers. The organisation of agriculture in France since 1918*. Cambridge U.P.
- CONTE, D. (1987): "Ceti rurali e salvezza della nazione: ideologia del 'Bauerntum' nella Germania weimariana", *Studi Storici*, 28, pp. 347-384.
- CORNER, P. (1974): *Il fascismo a Ferrara, 1915-1925*. Oxford U.P.
- CORNI, G. (1987): "La politica agraria del fascismo: un confronto fra Italia e Germania", *Studi Storici*, 28, pp. 385-421.
- D'ANTONE, L. (1991), "L' 'intelligenza' dell'agricoltura. Istruzione superiore, profili intellettuali e identità professionali", in BEVILACQUA, A. (ed.): *Storia dell'agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea. Vol. III. Mercati e istituzioni*. Venice: Marsilio Editori, pp. 391-426.
- FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, L. and PICADO, W. (2007): "Connections of the Green Revolution. State and technological change in Costa Rica, Mexico and Spain. 1940-1970". paper in the 4th Conference of the European Society for Environmental History (ESEH). Amsterdam, 2007
- FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, L. (2007): *El apagón tecnológico del franquismo. Estado e innovación en la agricultura española del siglo XX*. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
- GERHARD, G. (2008): "Agricultural Sciences and the Building of a Greater German Empire", in Wise & Saraiva: *Autarky. A workshop in Genetics and Political Economy of Fascism*. UCLA Center for Society and Genetics, May 2008.
- GIORGETTI, G. (1974): *Contadini e proprietari nell'Italia moderna*. Torino: Einaudi.
- GRIFFIN, R. (2007): *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. Palgrave.
- HARWOOD, J. (2008): "Plant Breeding and Peasant-Farmers in Nazi Germany". Work in progress, in Wise & Saraiva: *Autarky. A workshop in Genetics and Political Economy of Fascism*. UCLA Center for Society and Genetics, May 2008.
- HERF, J. (1984): *Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Cambridge U.P.
- KLUGE, U. (1988): *Bauern, Agrarkrise und Volksernährung in der Europäischen Zwischenkriegszeit*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- LACKÓ, M. (1995): "Fascismo e agrarismo. Aspetti dei movimenti fascisti nell'Europa centro-orientale", in DEL BOCCA, A.; LEGANI, M. and ROSSI, M.G.: *Il regime fascista*. Roma-Bari: Laterza, pp. 93-106.
- LYTTLETON, A. (2003), *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919-1929*, Routledge, London, 3rd. ed.
- MANN, M. (2004): *Fascists*. Cambridge U.P.
- MILLWARD, A. (1993): "L'Europa in formazione", in *Storia d'Europa*. Vol. I: *L'Europa oggi*. Einaudi: Torino, pp. 161-219.

OLIVEIRA BAPTISTA, F. (1990): “A política agrária do Estado Novo”, *Cadernos de Ciências Sociais*, 8-9, pp. 91-98.

PAN-MONTOJO, J. (2005), *Apostolado, profesión y tecnología: una historia de los ingenieros agrónomos en España*, Torreldones, Madrid, Asociación Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos.

- (2008): “El fin de un ciclo: las transformaciones de la propiedad y la explotación de la tierra en la posguerra”, in Enrique Fuentes Quintana (dir.): *Economía y economistas en la guerra civil*. Galaxia Gutenberg / Real Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Morales, vol. II, pp. 649-676.

PAXTON, R.O. (1997): *La France de Vichy. 1940-1944*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

RENTON, D. (2001): “The Agrarian Roots of Fascism: German Exceptionalism Revisited”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 28:4, pp.127-148.

RICO, E. (1998): “The expansion of the forest and the defence of nature: the work of forest engineers in Spain 1900-1936”, in Watkins, C.H. (ed.): *European Woods and Forests: Studies in Cultural History*. Wallingford: CAB International, pp. 181-190.

ROSAS, F. (1989), “A crise do liberalismo e as origens do ‘autoritarismo moderno’ e do Estado Novo em Portugal”, *Penélope*, 2, pp. 97-114.

— (2000): *Salazarismo e fomento económico*. Lisbon: Notícias.

SPOERER, M. and STREB, J. (2006): “The Economic Impact of the Nazi Armament Policy on the Welfare of the German Consumers”. Paper prepared for the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, Finland, 21 to 25 August 2006. Available at <<http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Spoerer.pdf>>.

TOOZE, A. (2008): “The Economic History of the Nazi Regime”, in CAPLAN, J. (ed): *Nazi Germany*. Oxford U.P., pp.168-195.

TROSSBACH, W. and ZIMMERMANN, C. (2006): *Die Geschichte des Dorfes*. Stuttgart: UTB.

VEIGA, F. (1987): “El vot agrari de la Guàrdia de Ferro, Romania 1929-1937”, *Estudis d'Història Agrària*, 4, pp. 215-233.